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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
WHEN MAY PARTIES LITIGANT ASSERT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF OTHERS?
Barrows v. Jackson'
In addition to the substantive constitutional law issue
discussed in the preceding note, this case brought forth
sharp argument as to whether that question was properly
before the court. It was argued that the respondent who
was being sued for money damages for her breach of a
restrictive covenant was relying on the rights of prospective
Negro purchasers as a defense, and thus that she was not
claiming an abridgement of any constitutional right of her
own, but was asserting the rights of others not parties to
the action. Mr. Justice Vinson accepted this argument and
wrote a vigorous dissent asserting that the Court "by a
unique series of arguments has developed a unique excep-
tion to an otherwise easily understood doctrine".2
The six justice majority opinion, apparently disturbed
by the argument, acknowledged that as a general rule a
party has no standing in the court to vindicate the constitu-
tional rights of a third party, but that under the peculiar
facts of this case a departure from the rule was warranted.
The Court then broke down its precedents into: (a) those
that supported the constitutional doctrine that in order to
have a "case" or "controversy", there must be a party with
a direct legal interest at stake in a real (not moot or hypo-
thetical) controversy' and (b) the self imposed doctrine
of the Court that it will not try constitutional issues at the
behest of one whose constitutional rights are not at stake.'
As to the former, the Court said:
"This principle has no application to the instant case
in which the respondent has been sued for damages
totaling $11,600 and in which a judgment against re-
spondent would constitute a direct, pocketbook injury
to her."5
1346 U. S. 249 (1953) - discussed on its merits in the preceding note
and with the facts sumciently set forth therein to support the procedural
point which is discussed herein.
2 Ibid, dis. op. 260.
'Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U. S. 346 (1911); Chicago &c. Railway Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U. S. 339 (1892) ; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 (1939).
' See Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, conc. op. 149-154
(1951) ; Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, conc. op. 341, 347-
348 (1936).
6 Supra, n. 1, 255-6.
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As to the latter, the Court said:
"This is a salutary rule, the validity of which we
reaffirm. But in the instant case, we are faced with a
unique situation in which it is the action of the state
court which might result in a denial of constitutional
rights and in which it would be difficult if not impos-
sible for the persons whose rights are asserted to
present their grievance before any court. Under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the rea-
sons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise
another's rights, which is only a rule of practice, are
outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental
rights which would be denied by permitting the dam-
ages action to be maintained."6
In the present case, the defendant to the damage claim
would suffer a direct legal injury, if not allowed to plead
the unconstitutionality of the Court's imposition of damages
even though such unconstitutionality arises primarily to
protect others.
It has long been established that in order to have access
to the Supreme Court, a party must have adequate standing
as a bona fide party litigant with a direct legal interest in a
real (not moot) case.7 This doctrine is generally recognized
to be part of the constitutionally imposed limitation that
the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to "Cases" and
"Controversies". 8
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in speaking of the judicial
power conferred by Article III of the Constitution said:
"The article does not extend the judicial power to
every violation of the Constitution which may possibly
take place, but to 'a case in law or equity', in which a
6 Ibid, 257.
1 See Coleman v. Miller, 8upra, n. 3, 460, 464, 467, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion:
"The Constitution further explicitly Indicated the limited area within
which judicial action was to move - however far-reaching the conse-
quences of action within that area - by extending 'judicial Power' only
to 'Cases' and 'Controversies'.
"No matter how seriously infringement of the Constitution may be
called into question, this is not the tribunal for its challenge except
by those who have some specialized interest of their own to vindicate,
apart from a political concern which belongs to all.
"We can only adjudicate an issue as to which there is a claimant
before us who has a special, individualized stake In It. One who is
merely the self-constituted spokesman of a constitutional point of view
can not ask us to pass on it."
'Supra, n. 3.
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right, under such law, is asserted in a court of justice.
If the questions cannot be brought into a court, then
there is no case in law or equity, and no jurisdiction is
given by the words of the article."9
In order to gain standing in the court, the plaintiff and
defendant must be adverse parties with a genuine contro-
versy; that is, it must not be merely a friendly suit. The
basic purpose of this constitutional doctrine (namely to
restrict the Court to acting judicially) is satisfied in the
instant controversy for the respondent is about to suffer a
direct pocketbook injury.
The Supreme Court has also developed for its own gov-
ernance in cases within its jurisdiction, other rules under
which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the
constitutional questions before the court.1" The court will
not decide a constitutional problem before it has to," nor
will it pass upon a constitutional question, if there is an-
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.'2
Where the validity of a statute is in question, the court will
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is possible
under which the question may be avoided.'" Also the court
will not adopt a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts of the case.'4
Along with the other rules adopted for its own gover-
nance, the Supreme Court early adopted what the court
called a "complementary rule of self-restraint", 15 which it
was claimed the court deviated from in the instant case,
setting up the requirement that a person challenging a
statute must show that he himself is injured by its operation
and is in the class to be protected.
There have been many cases reaffirming this principle.
In Tileston v. Ullman,16 a doctor sought to have a state
statute prohibiting the use of, or counselling in the use of,
contraceptives declared unconstitutional as a deprivation of
life without due process of law. The court held that the
doctor had no standing in the court as he was asserting the
9 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 264, 405 (1821).
10 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra, n. 4, cone. op. 341,
346-348.
IL Abrams v. Van Shaick, 293 U. S. 188 (1934) ; Wilshire Oil Co. v. U. S.,
295 U. S. 100 (1935). See n. 10, supra.
2 Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908) ; Light v. United States,
220 U. S. 523 (1911). See n. 10, supra.
,,Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) ; Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S.
573 (1929). See n. 10, supra.
1 Steamship Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885).
See n. 10, supra.
15 Supra, n. 1, 255.
1318 U. S. 44 (1943).
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rights of his patients and not his own. In Tyler v. The
Judges,7 the petitioner sought to have a land registration
act declared unconstitutional on the grounds that the rights
of parties might be foreclosed without actual notice to them.
The court held that since the petitioner did have actual
notice, and had not proceeded to assert his rights before
the land registration board and then by way of appeal there-
from, he had not shown that his property was being taken
from him without due process of law under the Act. The
Court reasoned that it could not pass upon the general ques-
tion of whether the statute would deprive others of their
property without due process of law.'"
The recent case of Doremus v. Board of Education,19 is
another example of the requisite standing necessary to
challenge a statute. A New Jersey statute provided for the
reading of verses from the Bible at the beginning of each
school day. The statute was sought to be declared uncon-
stitutional in an action by a parent, as such and as a tax-
payer, because it amounted to an establishment of religion
as prohibited by the First Amendment and made applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. The
court felt that the parent's action, based on harm to the
child had become moot by the child's graduation, and that
the taxpayer's action showed no measurable appropriation
of school funds for the purposes complained of.
This rule of the Court on taxpayers' actions stems from
Frothingham v. Mellon, ° where the right of a federal tax-
payer to challenge a federal statute establishing a grant-in-
aid program involving the appropriation of federal revenues
in assistance of state programs fostering maternity health,
was involved. The Court held that the petitioner could not
raise the issue; her interest in the money of the treasury
was so infinitesimal and she could make no showing that
17 179 U. S. 405 (1900).
18 The court recognized that there would have been a different problem
before it had the petitioner sought to challenge the constitutionality of the
act before the Board of Land Registration, so that he would have exhausted
his state court remedies before seeking Supreme Court relief, and had that
proceeding resulted in denial of his substantive claim. Of. Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928), where a non-resident motorist act which pro-
vided for service upon the non-resident through the Secretary of State was
involved. The act made no provisions for notice to be sent to the non-resident
defendant, although in this case, the defendant did have notice. The statute
was declared unconstitutional as a denial of due process, even though the
petitioner was not harmed. He was however in the class to be protected.
The constitutional validity of notice provisions is not tested by what has
been done, but by what may be done under the provisions.
19342 U. S. 429 (1952).
0262 U. S. 447 (1923).
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any of her tax funds were directly used for the program in
question. Thus, in order for one assailing a statute to pre-
vail, it was generally believed that one must show not only
that the statute was invalid, but that he had suffered or
was about to suffer some direct injury as a result of its en-
forcement, and not that he might suffer in some manner
with the people generally. The court did however limit
its result to a taxpayer seeking to enjoin the execution of
a federal appropriations act, for the interest of a taxpayer
of a municipality in the use of its money had previously
been held to be sufficiently direct to sustain his standing
to sue.2'
The court in Barrows v. Jackson,22 justified its departure
from the normal rule (if departure there was) by stating
that in other unique situations in the past, the court had
done the same.23 It cited in particular the case of Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.24 In that case an Oregon statute required
all parents to send their offspring to public schools. A
private military academy and a Catholic school sought to
enjoin the enforcement of the statute as a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court held for the private schools stating:
"... we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."'2 -
The Court thus rested its decision upon the constitutional
rights of the parents in a suit brought by others and thus
seemingly departed from the general rule. However, the
denial of the constitutional rights of the parents did threaten
the existence of property of the private schools, and also
to a degree interfered with the schools liberty to teach.2"
As such, although the schools were asserting the rights of
others, it was apparent that the unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the parent's rights likewise involved a taking of
the property of the private schools as well as an inter-
ference with their liberty.
Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601 (1879). Also the prevailing view is
that a state taxpayer may also enjoin an improper expenditure of state
funds, Page v. King, 285 Pa. 153, 131 Atl. 707 (1926).
Supra, n. 1.
2 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) ; Truax v. Raich. 239
U. S. 33 (1915) ; Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 8upra, n. 18; Columbia System v. U. S.,
316 U. S. 407 (1942).
, Supra, n. 23.
Ibid, 534.
0Ibidt, 535. Also Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 400 (1923).
[VOL. XIV
BARROWS v. JACKSON
In Truax v. Raich27 the Court was concerned with an
Arizona statute which required an employer to have at
least 80% of his employees native born citizens. An alien
employee, about to be discharged sought to have the statute
enjoined. The state contended that the servant was com-
plaining for his master, for the employer was subject to
prosecution, not the employee. But the Court dismissed
this contention saying that the act operated directly upon
the employment of aliens and therefore it was "idle to call
the injury indirect or remote".2 8
In Buchanan v. Warley,29 a white vendor who had con-
tracted to sell to a Negro was seeking to have a zoning ordi-
nance, prohibiting Negroes from living in a certain district,
declared unconstitutional. Although he was not a member
of the class, to which the ordinance was directed, the Court
held that the white vendor had standing to attack the
statute, because the statute unconstitutionally abridged the
vendor's right of alienation.
In all three of these cases last discussed, the complainant
was not a member of the class against which the language
of the statute was directed, but he did have a traceable
personal or property interest directly affected by the appli-
cation of the statute, which interest he was asserting in the
proceeding. Careful analysis of the Pierce case, 0 along
with those others cited as precedent by the majority opinion
for departing from the usual rule, makes it clear that the
complaining party in each instance had himself suffered or
would suffer a legal wrong by the enforcement or applica-
tion of an unconstitutional statute, even though the uncon-
stitutionality flowed from a denial of the rights of others.
The instant case is no different except that the uncon-
stitutional action of the state is not legislative (statutory)
action, but the state sanction of a damage suit (court action)
enforcing a common law validity for a racial restrictive
covenant. If that was to be permitted, there was no doubt
that the respondent would suffer a direct legal injury by
being obliged to pay damages in the instant suit. There
was no moot problem, no request for an advisory opinion,
nor was there an attack upon a statute (or state imposed
common law rule) by one not directly affected by it. It was
a simple case of a defendant to a law suit saying that if the
state court should hold him for damages, that would be
state action in unconstitutional enforcement of a racial re-
27Supra, n. 23.
Ibid, 39.
-245 U. S. 60 (1917).
Supra, n. 23.
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strictive covenant. Since the respondent could show a direct
injury, she could assert the rights of the parties who would
be discriminated against by enforcement of the restrictive
covenant and who could in no way assert their own rights.
There have been numerous cases in the state courts
which hold that a party may attack the constitutionality of
a statute which discriminates against a certain class of citi-
zens, where the citizens discriminated against could not
assert their own rights."' In Greene v. State, 2 a Defendant,
convicted under a statute which made it a penal offense to
commit blackmail against citizens or residents of Nebraska,
successfully attacked the statute as being unconstitutional
by reason of the fact that it protected only Nebraskans, and
therefore discriminated against citizens or residents of other
states under Article 4, Section 2. The court recognized
the general rule, but held it inapplicable where the persons
discriminated against had no means of bringing the question
before the court for its determination
It would seem therefore that when a party is before the
court in a proper "case" or "controversy" asserting a legal
interest which is being infringed upon as of the present
moment, it is proper for him to assert the constitutional
right of others, the denial of which constitutes the claimed
infringement.
With reference to the Court's stated willingness to de-
part from any self-imposed limitation in order to face an
important issue that might otherwise be left undecided,
there is little doubt that the case deserved to be heard upon
its merits and that the court acted wisely in not applying
its rule of practice. However, instead of the instant case
being treated as a departure from the rule against asserting
the rights of others, it might be regarded as a clarification
of the rule, emphasizing that the rule can be properly
applied only (1) to cases where there is lack of a "case" or
"controversy" within the constitutional meaning of that
term34 or else (2) to situations where, in applying the
rule as a self-imposed limitation to protect against a docket
over-crowded with unnecessary litigation, the Court can
a' Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021,
12 A. L. R. 1190 (1920) ; Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Newbert, 76 Cal. App.
445, 244 P. 946 (1926) ; State v. Shady, 100 Vt. 193, 136 A. 26 (1927).
52 83 Neb. 84, 119 N. W. 6 (1908).
Cl. 2:
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
"Where, of necessity, the Court must apply it because of the absence of a
"case" or "controversy" for want of a person or party in interest. See circa,
supra, ns. 3, 7, 8, 9.
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withhold relief without causing immediate monetary or
other direct injury to the party raising the constitutional
issue as previously suggested.35 All cases previously dis-
cussed herein where the self-imposed rule excluding stand-
ing to raise another's rights has been applied were cases of
a plaintiff volunteering the constitutional rights of others
as a basis for injunctive or declaratory relief (and without
showing threat of immediate harm to plaintiff for which
he had no other remedy). In the instant case, there was a
"case" or "controversy" before the tribunal so as to satisfy
the constitutional rule, and the respondent was not volun-
teering an attack upon state action but was asserting a
defense in order to avoid a direct pocketbook injury. This
would seem to distinguish the situation from the other cases
where the rule was applied and to eliminate the need for
concluding that the Court was making any serious excep-
tion to the rule.
CONTRIBUTION - METHODS OF ENFORCING
O'Keefe v. Baltimore Transit Co.'
The original cause of action in this suit arose out of a
collision between appellant's taxicab and appellee's street-
car on February 18, 1947, at Dundalk and St. Helena Ave-
nues. Suits were instituted on July 17, 1947, by the cab pas-
sengers against appellant and appellee, but before trial the
Transit Company obtained, on June 19, 1948, the proper
releases whereby the claims against both the defendants
were discharged in full. Having paid the total consideration
for the general releases, the Transit Company instituted
a new and separate action for contribution while the origi-
nal suits were still open on the docket, the releases not
having been filed therein. It obtained a judgment for one-
half the price paid for the releases, from which the defen-
dant appeals. Held: Affirmed.
The primary2 argument of the cab company was that
the Transit Company could not, without the consent and
participation of appellant in the settlement, institute a new
and separate proceeding for contribution while the original
suit was still pending. In support appellant cited from the
Supra, n. 26.
194 A. 2d 26 (Md., 1953).
2 Appellant also contended that the evidence was insufficient to show con-
current negligence on its part.
